Generic pharmaceuticals provide low-cost access to treatment. Despite their chemical equivalence to branded products, many mechanisms may hinder generic substitution. Consumers may be unaware of their equivalence. Firms may influence consumers through advertising or product line extensions. We estimate a structural model of pharmaceutical demand where consumers learn about stochastic match qualities with specific drugs. Naïve models, without consumer heterogeneity and learning, grossly underestimate demand elasticities. Consumer bias against generics critically depends on experience. Advertising and line extensions yield modest increases in branded market shares. These effects are dominated by consumers' initial perception bias against generics.
Introduction
Prescription pharmaceuticals constitute a large and growing share of medical expenditures.
Generic products have chemically equivalent active ingredients (i.e., the exact same molecule) and typically yield the same clinical benefits (e.g., Kesselheim et al. (2008) , Davit et al. (2009) ) at lower prices. Generic entry generally results in lower medical expenditures, increased access, and higher short-run consumer surplus. Consumers usually face strong financial incentives to utilize generics (Duggan et al. (2008) , Duggan and Morton (2010) , Goedken et al. (2010) , Scott Morton and Kyle (2011) ). Despite these inducements, generics only constitute about 85% of the prescriptions even a year after the loss of patent exclusivity (Berndt and Aitken, 2011) . Researchers and policy makers have argued that increased generic utilization would result in significant cost savings for government programs like Medicare and Medicaid ( [Haas et al. (2005) , Shrank et al. (2010 ), Frank (2007 Fischer and Avorn (2004) , Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2009) ).
Pharmaceutical markets are characterized by uncertainty and heterogeneity (e.g., Bailey (1997) , Crawford and Shum (2005) , and Ching (2010) ). Treatment efficacy and side effects differ across patients and each individual's match with a given drug is initially unknown. Furthermore, initial perceptions may be systematically biased, particularly for generic pharmaceuticals. Patients generally believe that generics are lower quality despite the scientific evidence (Colgan et al. (2015) , Greene and Kesselheim (2011) ). This may be especially important for patients who initially consumed the branded product.
Pharmaceutical firm strategies may further influence patient perceptions of generic value. Firms may promote their product through direct-to-consumer advertising or physician detailing, thus affecting perceived quality (e.g., Berndt (2005) , Iizuka and Jin (2005) , Kravitz et al. (2005 ), Bradford et al. (2006 , Sinkinson and Starc (2015) ). Pharmaceutical firms may develop follow-on products, often referred to as line extensions. These products may constitute real clinical innovation including formulations that can increase patient compliance or reduce side effects. Line extensions may, however, reduce or delay consumers' adoption of competing generic products (Hemphill and Sampat, 2012) . Given the difficulty consumers face in learning about product value, line extensions may effectively differentiate products in excess of any efficacy or side effect differences. This is particularly important as the line extensions often face later generic entry dates (Shapiro, 2016) . 1
These products are employed to effectively extend patent life.
In this article, we address these issues by analyzing the roles of consumer learning and pharmaceutical firm strategies in generic utilization. We estimate a structural model of drug demand that allows for heterogeneity in match quality between consumers and drugs. Furthermore, we allow for marketing activities to influence consumers' prior beliefs about brand quality. In doing so we build on and extend a rich literature on discrete choice demand model [McFadden et al. (1973) , Rosen and Small (1979) , Trajtenberg (1985) , Berry (1994) , Petrin (2001) ]. Our framework utilizes Bayesian learning models similar to those of Crawford and Shum (2005) and Shin et al. (2012) .
We focus on the U.S. oral osteoporosis (OP) drugs from 2007 through 2008. This market includes several branded pharmaceutical products as well as a line extension and a single generic entrant beginning in 2008. The OP market is significant in terms of disease prevalence and pharmaceutical revenues. 2 This sample is also notable as it minimizes two important, and typically unobserved, features in pharmaceutical financing. Pharmaceutical manufacturers sometimes provide coupons to consumers and rebates to both pharmacists and physicians that may undermine incentives from payers (Dafny et al. (2016) , Busetzina et al. (2017) ). These issues were less prevalent during our study period, are less common for the relatively low cost small-molecule drugs in our sample, and the use of such rebates for Medicare beneficiaries violates federal anti-kickback regulations.
We find wide variation in individual preferences across treatments. These treatment match values encompass both perceived efficacy and side effects. Patients and physicians have little initial knowledge, but most learning occurs within six months of treatment initiation. Models that fail to allow for both heterogeneous match values and learning yield biased parameter estimates and price elasticities. Our estimates suggest that advertising has almost no net effect on generic substitution -this is unsurprising as the branded products almost always cease advertising prior to entry by a generic competitor (Morton (2000) ). Line extension products increase demand for branded drugs, but counterfactual experiments suggest that their impact on osteoporosis drug spending is modest 1 Later generic dates often occur when line extensions are delayed beyond patent expiration when introduced late in a patent period followed by a lengthy FDA approval process. In relatively small product markets line extensions may never face generic competition.
2 Blume and Curtis (2011) report that roughly 30% of Medicare beneficiaries were treated for either fractures or OP without fractures with an estimated health care cost of $16 billion in the U.S. in 2002.
and they do little to forestall generic substitution. Consumers' individual experiences with branded products has a large influence on demand. Consumers initially perceive generic products to be inferior and only discover their equivalence through experience. These perception biases have a larger and longer-lasting impact on generic substitution and medical expenditure.
The article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we lay out the Bayesian learning model. Section 3 describes our patient-level Medicare claims data set, summary statistics and background on osteoporosis drug market. Section 4 discusses some identification issues. We present the estimation strategy in Section 5 and results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 describes the model fit through in-and out-of-sample predictions. We discuss threats to identification and inference in Section 8. Section 9 presents counterfactual policy simulations and Section 10 provides concluding remarks.
Model Overview
We estimate a structural model of pharmaceutical demand where patients are uncertain about drug match quality, are risk neutral, and myopic. Patients are all newly diagnosed with osteoporosis and have no initial experience with osteoporosis treatments, although they may have initial perceptions regarding product's efficacy or side effects. Perceptions and decisions are formed jointly with physicians, although we simply refer to the patient or consumer for ease of exposition. Initial expectations may be influenced by direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising, physician detailing, as well as unobserved differences in initial (t = 0) brand reputations. These initial priors may be particularly imprecise due to the complex nature of medical knowledge and treatment effect heterogeneity. Thus patients and physicians must learn about the match value between each patient and drug. Patients receive match quality signals beginning with the first treatment period (t = 1) and update their match quality expectations in a Bayesian manner. In the rest of the section, we lay out the model specification and the assumptions underlying the Bayesian learning model of drug demand.
Utility Function
Consumer i's utility from purchasing pharmaceutical brand j at time t is given by:
where β ij,t denotes patient i's beliefs about the stochastic match quality of drug j at time t. P ij,t is the out-of-pocket price paid by patients for each drug, X ij,t is a vector of other variables related to benefit-design. Finally ij,t is a patient-, drug-, and time-specific shock that could include transient changes in wealth or health. Notice that the utility is stochastic because the belief about the match quality is stochastic. The error term ij,t is unobserved by the econometrician, but is observable to the patient. We assume that ij,t follows iid Type I extreme value distribution. The patient is assumed to maximize expected utility given by:
Learning Process
Following the Bayesian learning literature (e.g., Crawford and Shum (2005) , Erdem and Keane (1996) , Ackerberg (2003) , Shin et al. (2012) ) we assume that match quality is not revealed in a single instance of drug use. Patients learn about the match quality by updating their beliefs over successive medication utilization experience. More specifically, they receive a noisy signal of match quality after each experience of a particular drug and combine the information contained in the signal with their prior beliefs to obtain posterior beliefs about the drug in accordance with Bayes' rule.
Let q ij,t be the quality signal patient i receives after consuming treatment j at time t. We assume that quality signals follow a normal distribution:
where β ij is patient i's true match quality for drug j and σ 2 q ij is the variance of the quality signal.
This implies that learning happens over multiple drug experience occasions and the quality signal is a noisy measure of the true match quality. We further assume that the true match quality is normally distributed in the population:
For identification purposes, we implement a change in variables and formulate this alternate expression for the Bayesian learning process (Shin et al., 2012) :
whereas η ij,t is the "signal noise" which represents the noise component of the quality signal.
Prior Beliefs
Patients are newly diagnosed with osteoporosis at time t = 0 and have no experience with osteoporosis treatment. Patients may, however, form expectations through consultation with physicians, other patients, or pharmaceutical advertising. Patient i s belief about the match quality of drug j at a given time t has the following normal distribution:
where µ β ij,t and σ 2 β ij,t are patient i s beliefs regarding the mean and variance of drug j s match quality at time t. For identification purposes, we define the deviation of patients i's prior belief about the mean quality (µ β ij,0 ) from the true mean quality of the match in the following way:
Where we refer to ν ij,0 as the initial "perception bias" of individuals prior to the initiation of treatment (Shin et al., 2012) . We allow the initial perception about true match quality of drug to be influenced by pharmaceutical firms' promotional activities. More precisely we allow for consumer heterogeneity in initial perception bias in the following way:
Where Ad ij and Detail ij are aggregate advertising and detailing expenditures respectively by firms for drug j in the month prior to individual i's initiation of treatment. Advertising and detailing are demeaned following the treatment of perception shifters in Shin et al. (2012) .
Posterior Beliefs
A patient consuming drug j at time t = 1 receives a quality signal and updates beliefs about match quality in a Bayesian manner. Posterior beliefs are normally distributed as the prior at time t = 0 and all subsequent signals are normally distributed. Hence the evolution of posterior beliefs can be fully characterized by the laws of motion for posterior mean and variance.
The posterior mean and variance are updated recursively using Bayes' rule:
where d ij,t is an indicator variable such that:
Iterating forward Equations 9 and 10 yields the following expressions for the match quality mean and variance at time t:
Using this expression for the evolution of posterior beliefs about the mean match quality of the drug and following the change of variables in Equations 5 and 7 , the expected utility in Equation 2 can be re-written as 3 :
Notice that the distributional assumptions on ij,t result in a random coefficient multinomial logit model where product-specific intercepts are composed of true mean match quality (β ij ) and perception bias (ν ij,t−1 ).
Data
We employ a 5% 
Oral Osteoporosis Drug Market
We focus on FDA approved first-line osteoporosis treatments. These treatments are recommended for newly diagnosed osteoporosis patients. During our study period (2007 -2008) 
Choice Set
Our data capture every osteoporosis prescription filled along with the product name, date filled, and the amount supplied. A prescription fill can be of varying lengths, typically 30, 60, or 90 days.
To address this issue, we construct a monthly panel using a 30 days equivalent fill for each of the six drug choices. 5 Table 1 provides the drug choices in our model and their market shares in both 2007 and 2008. 6 Notice that Fosamax had the largest market share in 2007 followed by Actonel.
The entry of generic Fosamax in 2008 resulted in a sharp decline in branded Fosamax's market share and only a modest decline in the market share of Actonel.
[ Table 1 about here.]
The exclusion of second-line treatments presents a challenge for our choice set. Since injectable treatments such as teriparatide are not observed in our data, we cannot distinguish between patients that forgo treatment altogether from those that transition to second-line. Consequently we normalize choices to Actonel and model demand across second-line treatments. We then consider attrition and censoring in our robustness analyses.
Out-of-Pocket Prices
Prescription drug plans usually include multi-tier formularies that can vary with respect to coinsurance or copayments, coverage in different benefit phases (especially the donut-hole), purchase points etc. Medicare Part-D beneficiaries face complex non-linear cost sharing schedules as they pass through different benefit phases -deductible, pre-initial coverage limit (pre-ICL), gap, and catastrophic coverage. This makes the construction of true out-of-pocket (OOP) prices a challenging task. We follow prior research [Joyce et al. (2002) Medicare Part D pricing structure provides a significant source of out-of-pocket price variation across brands, individuals, and time. We further normalize the out-of-pocket prices by the quantity dispensed and construct a monthly panel using out-of-pocket prices for a 30-days fill. Table 1 5 A person who has a 60/90 day fill in the data for instance appears as two or three sequential observations in our panel.
6 Throughout this article, we will present actual/predicted market shares split by calendar years 2007 and 2008 to highlight generic substitution.
provides average out-of-pocket prices for each of the six osteoporosis drugs in the sample for a 30 days fill.
Drug Switches
We observe individuals switch between different drugs over the course of their treatment period. This behavior is informative from an estimation stand point as it helps to understand how idiosyncratic match values are correlated across different drugs. We observe a treatment period of over 12 months for more than 32% of our sample. The evolution of individual market shares over a long treatment period provides a good source of variation to disentangle preference heterogeneity from systematic learning about the match quality of different drugs. Table 2 provides the switching pattern across various brands. The first column provides the total number of unique switches from a given drug and the second column gives the total number of switches to a given drug. Most of drug switches in our sample are switches to the generic drug when it becomes available; although, a small fraction of of changes switch from the generic to a branded product (≈ 5%).
[ 
Advertising and Detailing
We use aggregate pharmaceutical detailing and advertising data from IMS and Kantar Media respectively. These data document monthly promotional activities for oral osteoporosis drugs 
Identification Intuition for identification
Endogeneity is, of course, a particular concern for demand estimation. Consumers may differ in their unobserved preferences across products and select plans based on out-of-pocket prices; consequently, we focus on newly diagnosed patients. Patients are unlikely to know their preferences prior to treatment initiation and it is unlikely that these factors influenced initial plan selection.
These issues could, however, be especially problematic for plan selections made after consumers have begun treatment and learned about their own product-specific preferences. This issue arises during the second year of data for our first cohort. In Section 8 below we test whether informed consumers -those who have experienced treatment prior to play choice -choose plans with lower out-of-pocket prices for purchased products.
We also take advantage of the 2008 generic entry as a quasi-natural experiment. Generic entry provides an exogenous shock to out-of-pocket prices and our estimates include a control for the post-entry period (2008) and a post-entry cohort indicator (Cohort). These variables control for unobserved differences across time and cohorts, forming a difference-in-differences identification strategy. Furthermore, we employ data on each individual's out-of-pocket price schedule, constructed using plan and drug-tier information across all of a plan's consumers, rather than outof-pocket prices of an individual's purchased products. These detailed out-of-pocket price schedule data eliminate a common source of endogeneity in demand estimation.
Under Medicare Part D benefit design, future out-of-pocket prices depend upon current consumption; in particular, prices near the end of the calendar year depend upon consumption in earlier months. Our theoretical model imposes a myopic utility function and ignores these incentives. In our base model, we allow out-of-pocket price elasticity to vary over time by interacting P rice with the number of months remaining in the benefits period, M onth. Although we could not easily estimate more flexible models with Bayesian learning parameters, we explored a variety of simpler (logit demand) models that allowed for parameter heterogeneity as a function of time remaining in the benefit period. These models are discussed in the Robustness Section below and representative results are reported in Appendix B, Tables B.1 and B.2.
Consumer preferences could change with experience. Consumers may, in effect, tire of searching for new products. State-dependent preferences could bias our learning parameters which also change with experience. We re-estimated our Learning models while controlling for state-dependence (e.g., the number of previously tried products).
Identification of Bayesian Learning Parameters
The parameters of the Bayesian learning process
} ∀i, j are not identifiable in the current form. Identifying assumptions follow Shin et al. (2012) . We normalize the quality signal variance σ 2 q ij to 1 as the initial match quality belief variance σ 2
cannot be separately identified from quality signal variance. Their ratio (
) can, however, be identified. As mentioned earlier, we allow consumer heterogeneity in initial perception bias but we restrict the ratio of the quality signal variance to the initial match quality belief variance to be homogeneous across consumers such that
The true mean quality of the drug, β ij , is identified by a patient's steady state drug choices.
As the patient receives quality signals over successive drug experiences, learning occurs and the beliefs about match quality evolves to the true match quality. We observe drug choices of patients for up to 24 months following an initial diagnosis. This provides a sufficiently long time series to identify the true mean quality. We normalize one mean quality measure to zero (β iJ = 0) as not all drug-specific β ij 's are identified. We also normalize the initial perception bias for one product to zero (ν J = 0).
Estimation
We estimate parameters of the learning model using the Bayesian method of inference. The set of parameters is given by Θ = {Φ i } N i × Ψ where
set of individual-specific parameters and Ψ = {ν 1 , . . . ,ν J−1 , κ, α, γ} are aggregate level parameters.
The likelihood function is defined as:
We use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) scheme to draw from the stationary joint posterior density of the parameters. We burn in 1,000,000 iterations to address potential serial correlation based on initial priors. We then use the next 40,000 draws from the joint posterior distribution of Two additional models are estimated for comparison purposes. We estimate a mixed logit that allows for heterogeneous match values but implicitly assumes these are known to patients and their physicians ab initio. We also estimate a conditional logit that effectively assumes match values are known ex ante and identical across patients.
Results
We estimate parameters from three alternative demand models. The Logit model assumes that match values are homogeneous across patients and known ex ante. These models are useful for comparison to much of the pharmaceutical demand literature. We then estimate a Mixed Logit model which allows for heterogeneous matches between individual patients and treatments. Finally we estimate a Bayesian learning model that incorporates heterogeneous match values and further allows for patients and physicians to learn about match values over time. Parameter estimates for all three models are reported in Table 3 . 7 We label these models as Logit, Mixed Logit, and Learning in Table 3 and in the following text.
The first five rows of Table 3 provide estimates of the out-of-pocket price parameter (α) and other variables (X ij,t ) that are common across the three base models. Price elasticities abate slightly over the benefit period (γ 2 > 0) in all three models. Neither the Mixed Logit nor the Learning model parameters suggest significant differences before and after generic entry (γ 3 ) or across cohorts (γ 4 ).
We observe an out-of-pocket price parameter (α) ranging from -0.010 for the Logit model to -0.15 for the Mixed Logit estimates. These parameters are interpreted in Table 4 and further discussed below.
The second section of Table 3 describes patients' true mean quality. This is the average match The heterogeneity terms in the Mixed Logit and Learning models measure the dispersion of match values across patients for each product. 8 For each product we can reject the hypothesis that match values are homogeneous and heterogeneity is large relative to the average match value.
We further observe that the Mixed Logit model generates larger heterogeneity estimates than the Learning model.
[ Table 3 Table 3 demonstrates that the initial perception bias, ν j,0 , is, quite large on average and initial precision (κ = 0.01) is quite low. Based on these parameters, we calculate that most consumer learning (and switching) occurs within the six months of treatment experience. Unsurprisingly, both advertising (φ) and detailing (δ) improve consumer's initial perceptions of advertised products. Table 4 reports the calculated price elasticities for each product and model. Elasticity estimates differ widely across models. The Logit model assumption of homogeneous match values produces downward biased elasticity estimates. Conversely, the Mixed Logit model overestimates both consumer heterogeneity (see Table 3 ) and demand elasticities. Ultimately the Learning model suggests that demand is relatively elastic.
[ Table 4 about here.]
Generic elasticities are significantly lower than the elasticities of other products. This may appear counterintuitive, but there are several reasons for this result. All elasticities are normalized to Actonel. Although Actonel's out-of-pocket price is similar to that of other brands, it is more than 300% higher than the generic out-of-pocket price. Consequently a one percent change in any branded price should have a larger effect on demand than a one percent change in the generic price as consumers care about absolute, rather than relative, out-of-pocket prices. Furthermore, competition among generic manufacturers, perception bias, and automatic substitution processes all serve to keep generic prices from rising despite the lower generic demand elasticity.
Validation
We estimated the models in Table 3 using data from 70% of the patients in our sample and used data from the remaining 30% to evaluate out-of-sample predictive accuracy. We compare the predicted and actual market shares for each product over time using results from the Learning model in Table 3 . In Figures 3a and 3b we demonstrate a close match in market shares for the estimation and validation samples with mean squared errors of 0.0026 and 0.05 respectively. Our specification does, however, slightly understate the speed with which generic substitution occurs in 2008. In Figure 3a the actual generic market share exceeds the predicted market share both inand out-of-sample.
The model does a good job of predicting individual treatment choices within-sample, where we observe the estimated match values. It is, however, much less accurate when predicting out-ofsample individual treatment choices. Accuracy rates for the estimation and validation samples are 92.3% and 55% respectively. This result is unsurprising as even prescribing physicians have little ex ante information regarding patient-level match values.
[ Figure 3 about here.]
Robustness
We consider several major threats to the validity and robustness of our empirical models. We begin by exploring potential endogeneity and then discuss more flexible frameworks in terms of time controls and state-dependent preferences. In each case, results from our robustness test support our overall conclusions. 9 Finally, we consider issues of attrition and censoring in our data.
Endogeneity is, of course, a particular concern. While product characteristics are fixed through regulation, out-of-pocket prices could be correlated with unobserved variation in preferences. In particular, informed consumers could select insurance plans where out-of-pocket prices are lower for osteoporosis products generally, or for the products that a consumer prefers. In this case the structure of our sample and Medicare policy work to our advantage. All of our consumers are Table 5 shows that 2008 drug prices are nearly identical for both the informed and uninformed patients. Average out-of-pocket prices are, in fact, slightly higher for informed patients suggesting that plan selection is not a threat to identification.
[ Table 5 about here.]
The construction of our price measures also helps mitigate endogeneity. Rather than using simple transaction prices, we calculate the price schedule for each consumer, reflecting their plan's formulary as well as the patient's benefit phase (e.g., deductible, pre-ICL, gap, and catastrophic).
This reduces the common influence of consumption choice on price measurement.
We explored two additional sets of robustness tests to explore issues of myopia and state dependence. First, we explored additional interactions between out-of-pocket prices and benefit duration (M onth) to further relax the myopia assumption. A wide range of alternative specifications estimated via logistic regression yielded extremely similar parameter estimates and price elasticities.
A few representative models are presented in Appendix B. Bayesian versions did not fully converge and are not reported but the results appeared to be consistent with estimates reported in Table   3 . Finally, we allowed choices to depend on the number of previously chosen products to allow for state-dependent preferences.
Finally, patients with low match values may be more likely to cease oral osteoporosis treatment and those with high match values might continue treatment following the end of our data in December, 2008 . We consider the potential for differential attrition and censoring rates across choices.
In the data we observe that attrition rates are similar for most drugs, but they are considerably lower for those consuming generic alendronate. This difference is explained by the relatively late entry of generic alendronate -consumers that ceased oral osteoporosis in 2007 couldn't have chosen the generic. We also estimated hazard models of attrition, but the results were extremely sensitive to specification.
We can say something about the potential direction of bias due to censoring for our Bayesian learning parameters. While attrition is concentrated among individuals with low match values, censoring -treatment through December, 2008 -would occur for those with high match values.
Most learning occurs within the first three-to-six months of treatment and relatively few patients try more than two different drugs. Very few individuals experience censoring that substantively influence our match value estimates.
Counterfactual Policy Simulations
We conduct several counterfactual simulations to illustrate the roles of advertising, line extensions, and consumer perception biases in the generic substitution process. The following sections discuss them in detail.
No Advertising and Detailing
In the first counterfactual, we consider the consequences of eliminating pharmaceutical firms' advertising and detailing activities. We do this by eliminating the effect of advertising and detailing on the initial perception bias. More formally, we set ν ij0 in Equation 8 toν. This effectively lowers consumer's initial perceptions of advertised products.
In Figure 4 we observe predicted market shares based on actual promotional expenditures (solid lines) and counterfactual market shares with no advertising expenditures (dashed lines). Fosamax and Fosamax+D expenditures ceased prior to patent expiration and we see that their effects were both modest and short-lived. The elimination of advertising and detailing has the seemingly counterintuitive effect of slightly reducing the generic market share, by 0.7% (see Appendix Table B. 3).
This is explained by differences in both substitutability across produces and in the advertising levels. The generic's closest substitute, Fosamax, was heavily promoted in early 2007, but promotional activities ceased prior to generic entry. Consequently, restrictions on advertising and detailing would lower Fosamax's pre-generic market share and shift consumption to competing products such as Fosamax+D and Actonel. This loss in pre-generic entry Fosamax market share outweighs the reduction in branded competitor's advertising post-generic entry. This is consistent with the broader research on advertising and patent expiration (Ellison and Ellison, 2011) .
[ Figure 4 about here.]
An important caveat to this experiment is that our data include only those who initiate oral osteoporosis treatment. We do not consider the impact of advertising on treatment initiation rates; rather, we focus on switching behavior across products. While this focus is especially relevant for studying generic substitution it does not generalize to the general consequences of advertising and detailing.
Eliminating Line-Extensions
Our next counterfactual eliminates the line extension product Fosamax Plus D from the choiceset. We do this by setting an arbitrarily high out-of-pocket price for this drug. It is important to note that although we have relatively good data on patients' out-of-pocket costs, our measures of the gross drug cost -Paid by Medicare Part D -are upward biased. This is because we do not observe negotiated rebates paid by pharmaceutical manufacturers to payers. These rebates are almost certainly larger for branded products than for generics; thus, the total cost reduction should be viewed as an upper bound. We report these numbers in the conclusion despite the potential bias as we believe they still provide useful context for interpreting the magnitude of our effects.
Conclusion
We study demand for generic pharmaceuticals in the presence of consumer uncertainty and heterogeneity. We estimate a structural model of drug demand allowing for heterogeneity in match quality between patients and treatments. This heterogeneity may include both side effects and clinical effectiveness; although, side effect variation should dominate in our analytic sample. Initial perceptions about product quality may be biased and learning about match values occurs through experience.
We find that patients and their prescribing physicians have little initial information regarding match values. Their initial perceptions are biased, especially against generic products. This bias is particularly striking for consumers first exposed to branded products before generic entry.
This suggests that experiencing differences in product names, labels, and appearance may play an important role of shaping consumer perceptions of pharmaceutical products. We also find that promotional activities, both advertising and detailing, increase initial perception of product values.
Despite initially biased perceptions, consumers learn rapidly through experience. We find that initial perceptions are imprecise and most learning occurs within the first three-to-six months of utilization. This suggests that consumers and their physicians recognize the problems with initial information and respond quickly to patient experiences.
Heterogeneity and learning have important implications for measuring the effect of out-ofpocket prices. Our Bayesian learning model suggests that demand is relatively elastic, about -1.6 on average. We compare our results to logistic and hierarchical logistic models. Both of these models assume match values are known ab initio and the logistic model further assumes that match values are homogeneous across patients. We reject these assumptions and find that they have sizable implications for price elasticity estimates. Logistic models suggested relatively inelastic demand, with an average elasticity of about -0.07. Although it is difficult to generalize across different types of drugs and conditions, the logistic restuls are consistent with the larger literature on pharmaceutical demand (Goldman et al., 2007) . These findings are also consistent with the broader demand estimation literature, where naïve models often underestimate price elasticities (e.g., Nevo (2000)).
We use our estimates to explore the impact of generic perception bias on pharmaceutical demand. Consumers first exposed to the branded products are particularly biased against generics.
Eliminating this bias would greatly accelerate generic substitution, increasing generic market share by an estimated 27% in 2008. This change would reduce total oral osteoporosis expenditures by up to 7.8% and lower consumers' out-of-pocket expenditures by 11%. 10 By comparison we find relatively modest effects from eliminating advertising and line extensions. Eliminating line extensions would increase generic markets shares by 5.1% and had an almost negligible impact on both out-ofpocket and total costs. Unsurprisingly an advertising ban had almost no effect on generic market
share. This is because Fosamax ceased advertising prior to generic entry -a common strategy for products with expiring patents.
These results have a number of policy implications. These findings provide further evidence that generics suffer from perception bias and are, ultimately, viewed as high-quality products by informed consumers. There could be a number of mechanisms for increasing generic substitution.
State governments and pharmacy board can facilitate, or even mandate, substitution in the absence of a physician order (e.g., Shrank et al. (2010) ). Changes in naming and trademark policies could also be used to reduce perception bias (Greene and Kesselheim (2011) , Sarpatwari and Kesselheim (2016) ). Finally, our results suggest that some studies may understate pharmaceutical demand elasticities, suggesting that patients are more responsive to cost sharing than may often be assumed.
10 As noted in section 9, the total expenditure reduction is an upper bound and is provided for context. Notes: Column 2 in the above table shows the total number of individual switches from a given drug in our sample. Column 3 shows the total number of individual switches to a given drug. 10.27 (9.44,11.10) 6.09 (5.62,6.55) 5.89 (5.39,6.40) Generic, cohort 2008 (β 2 )
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Prior Distribution
We specify the prior distribution of our parameters as:
The joint prior distribution of our parameter vector Θ = {Φ i } N i × Ψ is thus given by:
Joint Posterior Distribution
Given the prior distribution of the parameter vector and the likelihood function, the joint posterior distribution of the parameter vector conditional on the data is given by:
Bayesian inference requires drawing from the joint posterior distribution of the parameter vector. It is possible to directly draw from this distribution using the Metropolis Hastings algorithm, but this is computationally slow. Consequently, draws from this distribution are obtained through Gibbs sampling. This is an iterative process that requires drawing each parameter conditional on other parameters. Following (Train, 2009) , we specify the Gibbs sampling procedure for drawing from the joint posterior distribution. 
A.2 Out-of-Pocket Prices
To construct true out-of-pocket costs for each drug we employed copayment and coinsurance information from the plans for each tier and benefit phase. Encrypted plan and contract identifiers in the Part D denominator files were linked to the PDE files. This identified the plan under which each beneficiary was enrolled in a given time period. Plan Characteristic files provided plan cost sharing and type of tier information: Brand/Preferred Brand (BPB), Non-Preferred Brand (NPB), Generic/Preferred Generic (GPG), Non-Preferred Generic (GPG), and d99 (plans that use a standard 25% coinsurance rate). These were available for both the pre-initial coverage limit (pre-ICL), the benefit phase preceding the donut hole, and Gap phases during the donut hole.
We first constructed the average gross drug costs for each drug covered by the tiers BPB, NPB, GPG, NPG, and d99 under each benefit phase and for each year. For the Deductible and Catastrophic phases, we only constructed the average drug cost by year. In order to construct drug costs by tiers, we merged the plan characteristics data with the PDE files for each year separately. We then coded gap and pre-ICL tiers using information in the plan characteristics files. We then generated mean average gross drug cost for each drug in each of the five tiers as well as the Gap and Pre-ICL phases for the two years.
The primary challenge we faced in constructing out-of-pocket costs for each drug under each plan was that in the 5% Part D sample we do not observe transactions for all relevant osteoporosis drugs in every plan. We employed the following rules to calculate out-of-pocket prices:
• Rule 1 If a drug is purchased for a given PDE plan then the actual formulary tiers (i.e., copayment and coinsurance rates) are applied to calculate the out-of-pocket cost.
• Rule 2 If no transactions are occurred for a given drug-plan combination we examined data from other plans with the same contract ID as plans within contract IDs have highly correlated formulary and pricing structures. Using this broader set of data we inferred the formulary tier and applied the appropriate plan-specific coinsurance and copayment rates to calculate out-of-pocket costs.
• Rule 3 If no transactions are observed for a given drug and contract ID we applied the formulary tier most frequently observed for that drug using data from other contract IDs. We then used the plan's own copayment and coinsurance rate for that formulary tier when calculating out-of-pocket costs.
• Rule 4 If we see that some drug is covered as NPG/NPB in the population but a particular plan does not have copay/coinsurance information on the NPG/NPB tier, we then use the copay/coinsurance information on GPG/BPB respectively, if available in computing out-ofpocket costs.
A.3 Mathematical Appendix
This section provides the derivation of equation 14. From equations 11 and 12, we have:
Substituting for the value of σ 2 β ij,t in equation 15 we get:
Subtracting β ij from both sides of equation 17 and simplifying gives:
Substituting from equations 7 and 5 and simplifying we get:
Substituting for ν ijt−1 from 19 in equation 13 we get: Tables   !   ! Table B 
B Additional Figures and
Initial Precision
Note: The figure shows that after a burn-in of 1 million iterations, the MCMC sampler mixes well which indicates convergence to the true posterior distribution. 
